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Artifactual  ﬁeld  experiments,  spatial  econometrics,  and  household  surveys  are  combined
in a single  study  to  investigate  the neighborhood  effects  of social behaviors.  The  dictator
and  public  goods  games  are  conducted  among  rice  farmers  in  irrigated  and  non-irrigated
areas  in the Philippines.  We  ﬁnd  the neighborhood  effects  but the  magnitude  and  statis-
tical  signiﬁcance  of  endogenous  social  effects  vary  with  the  irrigation  availability,  type  of
social behavior,  and  type  of neighborhood.  Altruistic  and  cooperative  behaviors  are  signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuenced  by the  behaviors  of  neighbors  only  in  the  irrigated  area,  where  social  ties
are strengthened  through  collective  irrigation  management.  Through  this  effect,  irrigated
farmers’  social  behaviors  become  similar  to those  of  one  another.  Neighborhood  effects
for  cooperative  behavior  are  stronger  among  farm  plot  neighbors  than  among  residential
neighbors,  which  may  reﬂect  their  interactions  in irrigation  management.  Although  non-
dynamic,  these  ﬁndings  are  consistent  with  the  theory  of  social  norm  evolution  through
common  pool  resource  management.
©  2015  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
. Introduction
A growing number of studies have documented the existence of many types of social behavior, such as altruism, trust,
nd cooperation and punishment for public purposes, contrary to the predictions of the standard Homo economicus model
Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Henrich et al., 2001; Ostrom, 2000). Moreover, many empirical and
xperimental studies have observed variation in patterns of social behavior across different groups of subjects (Cardenas
nd Carpenter, 2008; Gächter et al., 2012; Henrich et al., 2010; Lamba and Mace, 2011). Understanding the determinants
f social behavior is important because recent investigations insist that social behavior considerably affects key economic
henomena, including economic growth, poverty reduction, risk sharing, and collective action. Existing studies have focused
n macro-level factors, such as market integration, ecology, and culture, as well as micro-level factors, such as group size and
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socioeconomic heterogeneity (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Gächter et al., 2012; Henrich et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2000; Rustagi
et al., 2010).
Beyond the examination of the effects of these variables, interest in neighborhood effects has begun to grow. Anselin
(2003) addresses the signiﬁcance of neighbors’ inﬂuence on economic decision making. Through neighborhood interactions,
individuals (or households) affect each other’s personal decisions, preferences, information sets, and behavioral outcomes
directly rather than indirectly through markets. Hence, the decisions of neighboring individuals are likely to be interdepen-
dent. In the context of social behaviors, this type of neighborhood inﬂuence may  be interpreted as the effect of social norms
or community mechanisms.
Over the past decade, the development of spatial econometric techniques has made possible the statistical examination
of the interdependent behaviors of individuals who share spatial, social, and economic milieus (Anselin and Grifﬁth, 1988;
Anselin, 2003, 2010). In addition, a recent theoretical development in the social network literature provides us with a
strategy to solve the identiﬁcation problem of endogenous and exogenous neighborhood effects that Manski (1993) noted
in his landmark study (Bramoullé et al., 2009). Many studies have begun applying the spatial econometric techniques to
understand interdependent economic activities such as technology adoption (Case, 1992; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley
and Udry, 2010), economic growth (Pede et al., 2014; Abreu et al., 2005), recreational consumption (Bramoullé et al., 2009),
and institutional choice (Kelejian et al., 2013), but, to the authors’ knowledge, no attempts have been made to examine social
behaviors.
Our research strategy combines artifactual ﬁeld experiments, spatial econometrics, and household surveys within a single
study. Two experiments, a dictator game and a public goods game, are conducted to quantify the altruistic and cooperative
behaviors, respectively, of farmers in Bohol, the Philippines. In the context of rural agrarian communities, day-to-day social
interactions take place within these communities. Subsequently, the existence of neighborhood effects in social behaviors in
these local communities is tested utilizing spatial econometrics controlling for socioeconomic and agro-ecological factors,
which are collected through household surveys.
Particular attention is paid to the difference in the degree of neighborhood effects between irrigated and non-irrigated
(rainfed) areas. The collective management of common pool resources is considered an opportunity to strengthen ties and
generate social norms among local people (Aoki, 2001; Fujiie et al., 2005; Hayami and Godo, 2005; Hayami, 2009; Ostrom,
2000). A gravity irrigation system, which must be managed collectively by users in geographical proximity, was newly
introduced into a traditionally rainfed rice area within our study area two  years before our survey. This change is expected
to strengthen location-based ties and increase similarity in social behavior among geographical neighbors, which can be
captured in neighborhood effects utilizing spatial economics (Nakano et al., 2015). This paper intends to show empirically
how the increased importance of collective action among local people in the real world enhances interdependence in their
general social behaviors (altruistic and cooperative behaviors) among geographical neighbors.
A key ﬁnding of the empirical analyses is that neighborhood effects on social behaviors are observed, but the degree
of interdependence varies with the irrigation availability, type of social behavior, and type of neighborhood. Variations
are summarized in two aspects. First, altruistic and cooperative behaviors are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the behaviors of
neighbors only in irrigated areas, resulting in increased similarities in social behaviors in the irrigated area. Note that this
ﬁnding implies that outcomes may  not necessarily be pro-social because the neighborhood effect can reduce the level of
high contributors’ contributions to their neighbors’ level. Vicious cycles in conformism norm dissemination are possible.
Second, neighborhood effects for cooperative behavior are stronger among farm plot neighbors than residential neighbors,
which may  reﬂect their interactions in irrigation management in the real world. These ﬁndings are consistent with the
theory of norm evolution through common pool resource management (Aoki, 2001; Hayami and Godo, 2005; Ioannides and
Topa, 2010; Ostrom, 2000). The relevance of this interpretation is further strengthened by our supplementary ﬁnding; a
dissatisfaction message (a type of costly punishment from group members) increases the subsequent contribution during
the next round of the public goods game more effectively in irrigated areas. This supports the emergence of a stronger norm
enforcement mechanism in the irrigated areas.
Our study contributes to several streams of literature. First, it joins a growing body of literature on social networks.
Existing studies discuss the roles of networks in risk sharing (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007),
agricultural marketing (Fafchamps and Minten, 2002), capital mobilization (Banerjee and Munshi, 2000; Fafchamps, 2000),
acquisition of employment opportunities (Kajisa, 2007), and peer effects on economic behaviors (e.g., technology adoption,
consumption, schooling, and microﬁnance take-up) (Case, 1992; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010; Kremer
and Levy, 2008; Yamauchi, 2007; Bramoullé et al., 2009; Banerjee et al., 2012). We  situate our paper within the literature on
peer effects and emphasize that we examine such effects in social behaviors with ﬁeld data.1 Another unique contribution
is that we used geographical neighbors to examine the effects of location-based ties. An advantage of this framework is
that our estimation suffered little from the self-selection problem of network structure, which social neighbor factors (e.g.,
friendship) are likely to have. A disadvantage is that our analysis cannot contribute much to the literature on network
formation and the differential performances of formed networks, as our neighbors are set according to distance and, thus,
are practically given.2
1 Gächter et al. (2013) detected peer effects in social behavior in an experimental setting, rather than ﬁeld data.
2 See Alatas et al. (2012), Jackson (2008), and Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) for recent progress.
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Second, our paper adds to the body of literature that found the effects of social ties in the real world on social behavior
n their experiments (Binzel and Fehr, 2013; Etang et al., 2011; Goette et al., 2012). Our paper is consistent with these
redecessors in that the farmers’ experience of collective irrigation management is associated with the interdependence of
eneral social behaviors in the experiment.
Third, our possible contributions to the literature on social norms are twofold. Our results imply not only the development
f social norms through collective resource management but also the possibility of vicious cycles. Many experiments in
xisting studies establish a situation in which the examinees’ current behavior fails to meet the level expected by a social
orm, and thus, the experiment induces norm-based pro-social behaviors (Ferraro et al., 2011; Goldstein et al., 2008).
owever, the adverse effect could be possible in the real world. Because both cases were observed in our ﬁeld data, our
tudy provides a more comprehensive view of the effect of social norms.
. Background of the study site and survey
Our study site is located in the northeastern part of Bohol, an island in the Central Visayas region belonging to the Cebuano-
peaking culture of the Philippines. The Bayongan irrigation system located in the study area began operation in 2008. It
s a typical gravity irrigation system consisting of a reservoir dam, canals, water intakes, and farm ditches. In principle,
ater from an intake is shared by a group of farmers. The farmers are mandated to form a water-user group (WUG)  that
ollectively manages the construction and maintenance of farm ditches, the control of water intake, water allocation among
he members, and coordination with other WUGs. The system consists of 150 WUGs ranging in size from 4 to 70 farmers,
ith an average of 20 farmers.
The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) surveyed 239 randomly selected rice farmers over four agricultural sea-
ons from 2009 to 2011. The artifactual ﬁeld experiment was conducted in September 2011. These surveys provide the
rimary individual-level dataset for our study. The surveys include both irrigated and rainfed areas with sample sizes of
32 and 107 farmers, respectively. Because few rainfed farmers exist in the irrigated area, the former sample consists only
f irrigated farmers, while naturally the latter contains only rainfed farmers. To facilitate meaningful comparison of the
wo agroecosystems, we take advantage of the fact that the rainfed area within our study site, as well as the irrigated area,
as included in the feasibility study conducted by the National Irrigation Administration and deemed just as hydrologically
rrigable as today’s irrigated area, but it has not received irrigation services yet because of unexpected fund shortage, while
nancial support for construction is still forthcoming. In other words, we  sampled the rainfed farmers who were supposed
o be irrigated. The irrigated and rainfed areas are adjacent. The soil type (sandy loam) is the same in both areas, and the
ampled farmers share common background characteristics such as ethnicity (Cebuano), religion (Roman Catholic), value
ystems established in lowland ecology as well as other socioeconomic characteristics, which are examined statistically in
ections 5 and 6.3
The dataset consists of household characteristics, the results of the artifactual ﬁeld experiments, and geographical coor-
inates. Geographical coordinates are recorded for both the farm plots and the residences of the sampled farmers, which
llows us to deﬁne two types of neighborhoods (plot and residential) for each farmer.4 Figs. 1 and 2 present the locations of
he residences and farm plots, respectively.
. Neighborhood effects and hypotheses
Ioannides and Topa (2010) identiﬁed three sources of neighborhood effects. First, the direct effects of neighbors’ outcomes
n an individual’s outcome are known as endogenous social effects.  The propensity of an individual to behave in some way
aries with the prevalence of that behavior in some reference group containing that individual. For instance, individuals
are about their neighbors’ altruism, which then affects their own altruism.5 That is, one’s own decisions and the decisions
f others in the same neighborhood are, in some sense, mutually reinforcing. Second, individuals care about the personal
haracteristics of others, e.g., whether their neighbors are young or old, male or female, rich or poor, black or white, and
rendy or traditional. Such effects are known as exogenous social effects.  Third, individuals in the same social settings may act
imilarly because they share common unobservable factors or face similar institutional environments. Such an interaction
attern produces correlated social effects.  A precursor to this concept is found in Manski (1993), who  emphasized the difﬁculty
3 For network analysis, one may be concerned that the networks based on sample data may  not represent the population networks. A simulation result by
antos and Barrett (2008) indicates that random sample data perform fairly well when ties between individuals are constructed randomly. In our context,
 pair of people becoming geographical neighbors is not completely random but seems to be much less inﬂuenced by individual characteristics than the
ormation of social networks such as friendship or transaction-based relationships (see our discussion on self-selection issue in Section 3). Admittedly our
etwork data are not as perfect as those based on census data, but we still believe they fairly represent the geographical network structure of our study
rea.
4 For farmers with multiple plots, the coordinates of the plot claimed to be most important by the respondents are utilized.
5 Endogenous social effects appear when one cares about the expected outcome of the other’s decision even without observing the other’s actual behavior.
or  example, a common rate of monetary contribution to ceremonies (such as weddings and funerals) is implicitly set among the people. The co-variation
f  social behavior observed in our case provides another example.
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Fig. 1. Map  of the survey site in Bohol indicating the locations of the sampled farmers’ residences.in identifying endogenous and exogenous effects separately in linear models as well as in separating these two effects out
from the correlated effects. This issue is referred to as the reﬂection problem.
Bramoullé et al. (2009) provided a generalized approach for the identiﬁcation of social effects by considering an extended
version of the linear-in-means model, where interactions are structured through a social network. Their remarkable con-
tribution is their “easy-to-check” test for necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the identiﬁcation of (endogenous and
exogenous) social effects. We  introduce this test and perform it on each of our neighborhood structures to determine
whether (endogenous and exogenous) social effects are identiﬁed.
Conditional on passing the identiﬁcation test, we attempt explicit demarcation of the three sources of social effects in our
econometric model while referring to these social effects as “neighborhood effects”, as the network is based on geographical
proximity.
Note that the identiﬁcation of neighborhood effects may  suffer from a self-selection problem (Goette et al., 2012; Manski,
1993). That is, interdependence among individual decisions and behavior within a spatial or social milieu can be complicated
by the fact that individuals may  choose their own neighborhoods. In other words, individuals may  choose their neighborhood
effects by selecting their residence or workplace or both. Such choices involve information that is unobservable to the
researcher and thus requires inference about possible factors that contribute to their choices (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006;
Blume et al., 2011; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Mofﬁtt, 2001). In our analysis, however, the self-selection problem is assumed
to be negligible because we conﬁrmed in interviews that the farmers had not relocated or chosen their community due
to the introduction of the irrigation system. Sampson et al. (1999) support this point by indicating that the most reliable
conditions in favor of neighborhood effects include residential stability and low population density.The discussion above drives us to our main empirical questions of whether, under which conditions, and in what ways
farmers’ social behaviors are inﬂuenced by their neighbors’ behaviors and characteristics. The study site also indicates that
social interactions take place in the rainfed areas as well. Therefore, our ﬁrst research hypothesis is that
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1. The social behaviors of individual farmers are inﬂuenced by their neighbors’ social behaviors and personal attributes.
Second, social interdependencies are strengthened when individuals share a common pool resource and social space
hat generate constraints on individual actions (Aoki, 2001; Hayami and Godo, 2005; Ioannides and Topa, 2010; Ostrom,
000). Because the introduction of irrigation systems increases the demand for collective management of communal water
esources among geographical neighbors (Aoki, 2001; Fujiie et al., 2005; Hayami, 2009; Ostrom, 2000), our second hypothesis
s that
2. Neighborhood effects on social behavior, particularly on contributions to public goods, are greater in irrigated areas
han in rainfed areas.
Third, neighborhood effects on the contribution of public goods may  be greater when we  consider farm ﬁeld neighbors
ather than residential neighbors because more intensive collective action is required in the ﬁelds than in residential life.
ampson et al. (2002) also emphasize the need to examine social interactions at schools and workplaces in addition to the
ommon practice of searching for neighborhood effects in the place of residence. Accordingly, our third hypothesis is that
3. The endogenous social effects on the contribution of public goods are more salient among farm plot neighbors than
mong residential neighbors.
. Spatial econometric model
.1. Weight matrixTo represent a neighborhood structure of N sampled farmers, an N × N weight matrix W is constructed on certain crite-
ia. Because this paper focuses on geographical proximity rather than a social relation-based network, the weight matrix
onstruction is based on the arc distance between observations (spatial units) computed from geographical coordinates.
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First, we create a binary matrix with elements coded 1 when two  observations (spatial units) are deﬁned as neighbors and 0
otherwise. By deﬁnition, the diagonal elements of the matrix, which describe the self-relationship, are all zeroes. The binary
matrix is row-standardized so that the row sum is unity. To test the third hypothesis, two types of neighborhood structure
are considered, residential neighborhood, Wr, and farm plot neighborhood, Wp, which allows us to investigate which type
of neighborhood has a greater inﬂuence on farmers’ social behavior.
In our main model, the threshold distance criterion is adopted to construct the neighborhood structure. That is, for a given
farmer, all other farmers located within the threshold distance radius are considered his or her neighbors. Because setting a
long threshold implies a model in which far-off people are regarded as inﬂuential neighbors, which leads to disqualifying the
model, our strategy is to employ a threshold short enough to deﬁne neighbors who are signiﬁcant to a given individual. The
shortest possible threshold distance maintains that all observations (spatial units) have at least one neighbor (see Section 6
for more details). Later, weight matrices constructed by other criteria are examined to check for robustness in Section 8.6
4.2. Spatial regression
The econometric estimation procedure begins with a general model in which a farmer’s social behavior depends only on
his/her socioeconomic characteristics:
Y = X˛1 + ε1 (1)
where Y represents an N × 1 series of measurements of social behavior (altruistic or contributory behavior) for the indi-
vidual farmers, X represents an N × K matrix containing vectors of K variables that measure individual agricultural and
socioeconomic characteristics, and ε1 represents the residual or error term.
The exogenous social effects discussed in Section 3 are systematically modeled by Autant-Bernard and LeSage (2011),
utilizing a spatial econometrics framework. Eq. (1) can be modiﬁed algebraically as follows to include the inﬂuence of
neighbors’ characteristics:
Y = X˛2 + WsXˇ2 + ε2 (2)
where Ws (s = r, p) is an N × N weight matrix, and WsX is an N × K matrix containing vectors of the neighbors’ weighted
averages for the K variables. This speciﬁcation is also called a cross-regressive model.
Spatial diagnostic tests are then performed on the residual ε2 to determine the appropriate spatial process (see Anselin
et al., 1996). Performing a set of Lagrange multiplier tests and following the procedure outlined in Anselin et al. (1996),
potential speciﬁcations include (a) a spatial lag model (with spatially lagged independent variables), (b) a spatial error model
(with spatially lagged independent variables), (c) a combination of the previous two models (ARAR model with spatially
lagged independent variables), and (d) a cross-regressive model (i.e., Eq. (2)). Speciﬁcations (a)–(c) are expressed as follows:
(a) Y = 3WsY + X˛3 + WsXˇ3 + ε3 (3)
(b) Y = X˛4 + WsXˇ4 + ε4, ε4 = 4Wsε4 + 4 (4)
(c) Y = 5WsY + X˛5 + WsXˇ5 + ε5, ε5 = 5Wsε5 + 5 (5)
where the coefﬁcients , ˇ, and  capture the endogenous social effects, exogenous social effects, and correlated social effects,
respectively. The coefﬁcient  indicates the degree of interdependence in social behavior among neighbors. The error terms
in Eqs. (4) and (5) are modeled to capture linear correlated social effects in cases where similar behavior among neighbors
occurs because unobserved determinants of behavior are correlated across the deﬁned neighbors to each individual. In this
respect, the spatial error component is included to absorb and separate out such correlated effects, which contributes to the
identiﬁcation of exogenous and endogenous neighborhood effects.
Eqs. (3)–(5) are transformed into reduced form equations as follows:
(a) Y = (I − 3Ws)−1(X˛3 + WsXˇ3) + (I − 3Ws)−1ε3 (6)
(b) Y = X˛4 + WsXˇ4 + (I − 4Ws)−14 (7)
−1 −1 −1(c) Y = (I − 5Ws) (X˛5 + WsXˇ5) + (I − 5Ws) (I − 5Ws) 5 (8)
In light of the nonlinearity in coefﬁcients, these spatial models (a)–(c) are popularly estimated by maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) (e.g., Ord, 1975).7 In this paper, we follow the MLE  procedures available in the ‘spdep’ package in R.8
6 For the construction of spatial weight matrices, we used GeoDa 1.6.5 for the threshold-based construction and the “spdep” package on the R 3.1.1
platform for other types of construction, including k-nearest, distance decay, and village neighbor.
7 The use of least squares regressions would suffer severe endogeneity bias unless properly treated with valid instrumental variables. A prime example
of  success is the 2SLS estimations conducted by Bramoullé et al. (2009), in which higher-degree neighbors are adopted for identifying instruments of
which  the validity is assured by the test for necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for identiﬁcation. Recently, their feat was  precisely followed by Krishnan
and  Patnam (2014) to study farmer-to-farmer technology dissemination in Ethiopia using IV. Another viable method is generalized methods of moments
(GMM), suggested by Lee (2007) and further developed by Lin and Lee (2010) and Elhorst (2010) by discussing the pros and cons of these different methods.
8 R is free computational software. We used version 3.1.1. For more details, visit http://cran.r-project.org/.
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rovided that our neighborhood structures satisfy the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the identiﬁcation of neighbor-
ood effects (see Section 4.3), we assume that the MLE  procedure of the spatial econometric models stands.
.3. Test for social effects identiﬁcation
As discussed in Section 3, we follow the procedure of the test for necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for social effect
dentiﬁcation provided by Bramoullé et al. (2009). In the most general case of allowing for the existence of correlated social
ffects, the identiﬁcation condition is characterized as follows:9
roposition. Consider Eq. (3). Suppose that 3˛3 + ˇ3 /= 0. If the matrices I, W , W2, and W3 are linearly independent, social
ffects are identiﬁed.10 Next, suppose that W3 = 0I + 1W + 2W2. If rank(I − W ) < N − 1 and 20 + 1 + 1 /= 0, social effects are
dentiﬁed. In contrast, if rank(I − W ) = N − 1, social effects are not identiﬁed since higher order network terms of X cannot be used
s valid instruments to estimate the model consistently.
. Survey data
.1. Agricultural and socioeconomic variables
Agricultural and socioeconomic variables constitute the vector of variables X. This paper employs variables for the farmer’s
ge (year), gender (dummy  = 1, if male), years of schooling (year), ﬁeld size (ha), assets (Philippine Pesos, P hereafter)11,
ousehold size in terms of the number of household members, and ratio of females in the household (proportion), as well as
he pricing system for irrigation water (dummy  = 1, if volumetric and =0, if area-based pricing)12 to test whether any of these
ariables can explain the observed social behavior.13 We  expect that the groups facing volumetric incentives will contribute
ore to public goods because the demand for collective water management to save water is higher under that pricing system
positive marginal cost of water) than under the area-based pricing system (zero marginal cost). The average is calculated
ver four crop seasons for ﬁeld size, assets, household size, and female ratio. The logarithm of the assets variable better
pproximates a normal distribution. The sample means and standard errors of these variables are summarized according to
rrigation status in Table 1.
To validate the comparison of neighborhood effects between the irrigated and rainfed samples, despite sampling rainfed
arms from an area similar to the irrigated area, it must be demonstrated that the difference in social behavior arises from
he difference in the way farmers interact due to their ecosystem rather than from the difference in intrinsic demographic
actors. The rightmost column in Table 1 presents the t-test diagnostics for the mean differences in the mentioned variables
etween the two ecosystems. The only highly signiﬁcant difference is observed in ﬁeld size. From our observations in the
eld, rainfed farmers tended to overestimate the size of their plots, while irrigated farmers knew the exact dimensions of
heir ﬁelds because these were ofﬁcially measured when the irrigation system was introduced.14 Nevertheless, attention is
aid to this variable when discussing the regression results. For all other variables, however, the mean difference is neither
tatistically signiﬁcant nor large in magnitude. Therefore, we  assume that there is little intrinsic difference between the
rrigated and rainfed farmers in the sample, except the irrigation system itself.
.2. Experimental games design
Our dependent variables are the indicators of social behavior, which are the results of our artifactual ﬁeld experiments.
o elicit farmers’ social behavior, the IRRI conducted the following two  types of experimental games utilizing a standard
rotocol: (1) the dictator game for measuring altruistic behavior and (2) a repeated public goods game for measuring behavior
ontributing to public works.15
9 For derivation, read the paragraphs related to Proposition 5 in Bramoullé et al. (2009).
10 As suggested by Bramoullé et al. (2009), one easy way to check whether these four matrices are linearly independent is as follows. First, vectorize each
atrix, that is, stack its columns on top of each other. Second, verify whether the matrix formed by concatenating these stacked vectors has rank four.
11 Assets are included as an indicator of farmers’ general wealth. The measure includes agricultural, non-agricultural, and livestock assets.
12 Under the current regulations, each farmer provided with irrigation must pay the National Irrigation Administration an irrigation service fee equivalent
o  150 kg of paddy per hectare per season (an area-based pricing system). For the sake of another research project, half of the WUGs were randomly selected
o  receive a monetary equivalent to their water savings based on consumed volume (volumetric reward system), while the other half was  paid under the
urrent pricing method.
13 To address multicollinearity, the coefﬁcient of correlation was  calculated for all combinations of the variables included in any regression and was
onﬁrmed to be, at most, 0.35 in absolute terms.
14 We compared farmers’ estimates and GPS measurements for some rainfed farms and observed a tendency to overestimate size.
15 We followed the experimental protocols of Carpenter et al. (2004), Schechter (2007), Carpenter and Seki (2011), and Aoyagi et al. (2014). The experiment
as  conducted in two locations: the National Irrigation Administration regional ofﬁce and a community hall. We conducted one full session per day for six
onsecutive days to complete the experiment for the entire sample. The participants were strictly prohibited from revealing the contents of the experiment
ntil  the last day of the experimental period. A show-up fee of 150 Philippine pesos (P, hereafter) was  paid to the participants in two payments of P 50 at
he  beginning of the experiment and P 100 at the end of the experiment for participants who followed instructions and completed the game. At the time
f  the experiment (September, 2011), one US dollar was equivalent to approximately P 43, and the typical daily wage rate for agricultural labor was P 200.
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Table  1
Descriptive statistics for agricultural and socioeconomic variables by irrigation availability.
(1)
Overall
(N = 239)
(2)
Irrigated areas
(N = 132)
(3)
Rainfed areas
(N = 107)
(4)
t-Test for mean difference
|(3) − (2)|
[p-Value]
Volumetric pricing dummy 0.561
(0.498)
Age 51.138 49.689 52.925 3.236
(12.086) (12.248) (11.692) [0.039]**
Gender dummy 0.707 0.758 0.645 0.113
(0.456) (0.430) (0.481) [0.057]*
Years  of schooling 6.364 6.144 6.636 0.492
(3.037) (2.922) (3.166) [0.214]
Ln  asset 10.705 10.444 10.724 0.280
(1.097) (1.193) (1.034) [0.813]
Field  size (ha) 1.449 1.167 1.796 0.629
(1.013) (0.682) (1.229) [0.000]***
Household size (head count) 5.959 6.144 5.731 0.413
(2.305) (2.321) (2.275) [0.169]
Household female ratio 0.499 0.484 0.518 0.035
(0.162) (0.148) (0.177) [0.103]†
Note: The sample means are presented. The standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% statistical signiﬁcance
levels, respectively, for the mean difference between irrigated and rainfed areas. For the mean difference, absolute values are presented.
Source:  Authors’ calculation utilizing data collected by IRRI.
5.2.1. The dictator game
This game was played by an arbitrary pair of individuals: a dictator and a receiver. The dictator was  not informed who
his or her partner was, and vice versa. The dictator was given P 100, which was  equivalent to two-thirds of the daily wage
for a typical farmer in the study area, while the receiver was  not given money. Then, the dictator was  asked to select the
amount x ∈ {0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100} to transfer to the receiver whereby the receiver was  someone in the
same village.16 We  speciﬁed that the receiver was a person from the same village rather than anybody in society to allow the
participants to feel spatial proximity with the receiver. The dominant strategy for a person behaving as a Homo economicus
is to transfer no money. Therefore, the reported amount was  considered an indicator of each dictator’s altruistic behavior
within the village community. The game was a one-shot interaction.
5.2.2. Two-rounds of the public goods game with monitoring and a message
In the repeated public goods game experiment, participants were sorted into groups of four persons within the same
village but were not informed of the identity of their group members. Then, each member was  given P 100 and asked to
select an amount x ∈ {0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100} to contribute to the group to which he or she belonged. The
total amount contributed by all members was doubled and shared evenly among the members, regardless of how much
each member contributed. Thus, the payoff function of this game is represented by the following equation:
∏
i
(xi, xj) = (100 − xi) +
1
4
× 2 ×
⎛
⎝∑
j /=  i
xj + xi
⎞
⎠ .
The dominant strategy is no contribution, which reﬂects the incentive to free ride.
After the ﬁrst round of the game, participants were allowed to secretly observe the contribution from each member by
paying P 1. Then, they were allowed to send an anonymous ‘unhappy’ signal to a particular member to indicate displeasure
at a cost of P 1 per message.17 This process introduced costly punishment to the game. The second round of the game was
played immediately after the ﬁrst round in the same groups. The amount of the contribution provided a measure of the
player’s cooperative behavior toward public works or anti-free-riding behavior.
The following games were conducted: dictator game, ultimatum game, trust game, donation game, one-round public goods game, two-round public goods
game,  and risk game. The ﬁnal payoff for the experiment was determined by one of these games. The game was picked up by each participant with a lottery
at  the end of the session. Our experimental instructions appear in supplementary material. Our instructions and the setting of the experiment (English and
local  language versions) appear in Appendix A of online supplementary materials.
16 In our experimental games, village is expressed by the local term barangay, which is the smallest ofﬁcial administrative unit corresponding to the
concept of village in general.
17 We utilized an ‘unhappy’ face icon card to convey the message of dissatisfaction. The cards were secretly given to the designated persons at the
beginning of the second round of the game played by the same group of partners as in the ﬁrst round (Carpenter and Seki, 2011).
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.3. Control variables in the public goods game analysis
.3.1. Risk preference
One critical variable to control for in the estimation of the public goods game is the farmers’ individual risk-taking
ehavior. Some theoretical studies of experimental games and social capital suggest that the propensity to transfer money
n games similar to the public goods game in which the subject receives some amount in return from the partner(s) should be
losely associated with the willingness to take risks (Cook and Cooper, 2003; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001). These reports
ndicate that individuals’ propensity to bet in return-expected games is at least partly explained by their bet in a risk game.
herefore, we also conducted a risk game based on Schechter (2007).18 The game was  played by one person. The player
eceives P 100 and has an opportunity to bet a portion of this money. The bet was  multiplied by 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, or 2.5. These
umbers were determined when the player drew one of six cards bearing one of these numbers with an equal probability
f being selected. The amount each player bet was recorded as an indicator of the individual’s risk preference.
.3.2. Message receipt dummy
The message receipt dummy  (MRD) takes the value 1 if the individual received at least one message of dissatisfaction
rom group members after the ﬁrst round of the public goods game, and 0 otherwise. The MRD  variable is included in
he regressions for the second round, and a positive coefﬁcient is expected because peer pressure discourages free riding
ehavior.19
.3.3. Free riding index
The free riding index (FRI) is deﬁned as the product of two  variables: (a) the average of the group members’ contribution
inus one’s own contribution, which indicates the relative degree of free riding within the group, and (b) a dummy  variable
ndicating whether one reviewed the other group members’ contributions. The FRI is intended to express the recognition of
ne’s own free riding relative to the group members’ contribution.20
.3.4. The interaction between MRD  and FRI
It is assumed that the effect of receiving messages increases when one is free riding and is aware of this action. To control
or this impact, an interaction term between the MRD and FRI is created and included in the regressions.
.3.5. Contribution in the ﬁrst round
Another key control variable for the second round of the game is one’s own contribution during the ﬁrst round. Ones
nd Putterman (2007) note that individuals who offer high contributions during the ﬁrst round tend to contribute at similar
evels during the second round. They conclude that public goods contributions are somewhat persistent even in the presence
f sanctions. Thus, without controlling for this tendency, variables such as the MRD  would suffer from severe estimation
ias.
The descriptive statistics of the variables from the games are summarized in Table 2 with a view toward comparing
he two samples. There is no signiﬁcant difference in the means of these variables except that the dictator game produces
lightly higher results in the irrigated areas than in the rainfed areas. Tables 1 and 2 suggest that farmers living in these two
cosystems are not discernibly different. However, the mechanism of determination, particularly regarding neighborhood
ffects, could be different.
. Neighborhood structure
Four different weight matrices are constructed that correspond to the four types of neighborhoods considered: (a) plot
eighborhood for irrigated farmers, (b) plot neighborhood for rainfed farmers, (c) residential neighborhood for irrigated
armers, and (d) residential neighborhood for rainfed farmers.
The threshold (in kilometers) was 0.959, 1.302, 0.956, and 1.376 for neighborhoods (a), (b), (c), and (d), respectively.
ecause our purpose is to undertake a fair comparison across neighborhoods, we impose a uniform threshold distance for
ll neighborhoods. We  ﬁrst employed the longer thresholds (1.302 and 1.376), and the estimation results were by and large
tatistically insigniﬁcant. By contrast, the shorter thresholds led to both signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant estimates of endogenous
ocial effects depending on the neighborhood and type of social behavior. In the next section, the result based on the uniform
hreshold of 0.956 km is examined. Other types of neighborhood structures are tested in Section 8 for robustness.
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the four weight matrices. The imposition of the uniform threshold distance
eems to be reﬂected in the insigniﬁcant mean difference in average neighbor distance between the two  ecosystems. The
18 Return-expected games are games in which the player knows that he or she receives an uncertain payoff as a result of his or her choice of action.
19 We also estimated regressions utilizing the number of complaints received instead of the MRD. Utilizing this measure, the coefﬁcients were smaller
nd  less signiﬁcant.
20 We also substituted variable (a) for the FRI because one’s degree of free riding can be indirectly recognized through the return on the contribution. The
stimated coefﬁcients were less signiﬁcant.
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Table  2
Descriptive statistics for the results of the artifactual ﬁeld experiment by irrigation availability.
(1)
Overall
(N = 239)
(2)
Irrigated areas
(N = 132)
(3)
Rainfed areas
(N = 107)
(4)
t-Test for mean difference
|(3) − (2)|
[p-Value]
Dependent variables
Dictator game 29.874 32.197 27.009 5.188
(19.884) (21.555) (17.278) [0.045]**
PG  game, round 1 54.226 53.182 55.514 2.332
(23.030) (22.080) (24.194) [0.437]
PG  game, round 2 52.343 51.818 52.991 1.172
(24.209) (23.633) (24.999) [0.710]
Control variables
Risk preference 53.473 54.470 52.243 2.227
(25.718) (24.380) (27.345) [0.507]
PG  game, round 1 message receipt
dummy  (MRD)
0.280 0.273 0.290 0.017
(0.450) (0.447) (0.456) [0.772]
PG  game, round 1 free riding index (FRI) 0.000 0.455 -0.561 1.015
(15.367) (14.746) (16.152) [0.613]
Note: The standard deviations are in parentheses. ** indicates the 5% statistical signiﬁcance level for the mean difference between irrigated and rainfed
areas.  For the mean difference, absolute values are presented.
Source:  Authors’ calculation utilizing data collected by IRRI.
Table 3
Neighborhood structure: characteristics of the 4 weight matrices.
Field plot neighbors Residential neighbors
(1)
Irrigated areas
(2)
Rainfed areas
(3)
t-Test for mean
difference
|(2) − (3)|
[p-Value]
(4)
Irrigated areas
(5)
Rainfed areas
(6)
t-Test for mean
difference
|(5) − (4)|
[p-Value]
Weight code (a) (b) (c) (d)
Number of observations 131 107 132 107
Total number of links 860 1176 866 1296
Non-zero weights (%) 5.01 10.27 4.97 11.32
Average number of neighbors per
person
6.565 10.991 4.426 6.561 12.075 5.514
(2.649) (4.292) [0.000] (3.119) (5.275) [0.000]
Average distance between
neighbors (km)
0.603 0.589 0.013 0.583 0.581 0.002
(0.236) (0.245) [0.223] (0.243) (0.251) [0.847]Note: Threshold distance = 0.956 (km). The threshold distance is the distance that ensures that, for any one of the four neighborhood structures, there is at
least  one neighbor for every observation. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
average number of neighbors per individual and the average distance between neighbors are in a trade-off relationship. The
t-test suggests that farmers have more neighbors in the rainfed areas than in the irrigated areas. We control for this in the
robustness check by employing a different weight matrix.21
7. Results
7.1. Identiﬁcation test
The test for necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the identiﬁcation of neighborhood effects (Section 4.3) was  conducted
on each of the four neighborhood structures. First, equation 3˛3 + ˇ3 /= 0 was upheld for all cases, which is implied by
Tables 5–7. Second, it held that the four matrices I, W , W2 and W3 were linearly independent from one another for all
four types of W.22 Third, supposing that W3 = 0I + 1W + 2W2, it is easy to satisfy 20 + 1 + 1 /= 0. Finally, the inequality
equation, rank(I − W ) < N − 1, held true for all four neighborhoods. Hence, neighborhood effects (exogenous and/or endoge-
nous) are identiﬁed in all the neighborhoods (a)–(d). This result implies that our chosen neighbor interaction structure (W)
induces variation in the magnitude of interactions such that each farmer has a unique and different set of neighbors. This
result ensures that the spatial regressions in the following sections are not tautological and spurious.
21 See Appendix B of the online supplementary materials for examples of graphical representation of neighborhood links and the weight matrix.
22 We vectorized each of the four N-by-N matrices I, W,  W2 and W3 (i.e., for each matrix, the columns are stacked on top of each other), concatenated
these  four N2-by-1 vectors into an N2-by-4 matrix, and conducted a matrix rank test. Consequently, we  obtained rank = 4 for all four types of W.
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.2. Spatial model selection
To select the appropriate spatial process, Lagrange multiplier tests were performed on the residuals of the cross-regressive
stimations for each of the twelve cases (three games multiplied by four spatial weights). The test statistics and our corre-
ponding model choice are summarized in Table 4. The appropriate spatial model is chosen following the procedure outlined
n Anselin et al. (1996). In a few cases, an alternative model was also estimated to check the robustness of the estimated
arameters.
.3. Estimation results
Tables 5–7 present the estimation results for the dictator game, the ﬁrst round of the public goods game, and the second
ound of the public goods game, respectively.
.3.1. The dictator game
In the irrigated areas, the endogenous social effect parameter, , is positive and signiﬁcant for neighborhoods (a) and
c) (in the ﬁrst model). This ﬁnding indicates that farmers’ altruistic behavior co-varies positively with their neighbors’
ltruistic behavior and produces homogeneous social behavior among neighbors. Importantly, it is not a covariate shock
ut the altruistic behavior itself that generates this mutual dependence, as indicated by the speciﬁcation diagnosis. Thus,
t may  be inferred that the introduction and availability of irrigation that requires collective management promoted the
ocial interactions and spatial interdependence of social behaviors, which led to the emergence of a type of social norm.
y comparing the magnitude of  for (a) and (c), we claim that the endogenous social effect is larger and more signiﬁcant
mong residential neighbors than among plot neighbors. Altruistic actions may  be more closely associated with daily life
ctivities around residences than with farming activities in the ﬁelds.
The only highly signiﬁcant exogenous social effect is observed for ﬁeld size among plot neighbors. Among the individual
haracteristics, the effect of the ratio of females in the household is positive and signiﬁcant. Existing studies document mixed
ffects of gender, and our results are consistent with Dufwenberg and Muren (2006), who report that people from certain
roups are more generous and equalitarian when women are a majority of the group.
No endogenous social effect is detected in rainfed areas. Farmers’ individual plot sizes, however, might exert a positive
ffect on their altruism. In the absence of intensive collective action, individual farmers’ altruistic behavior is at least partially
etermined by the abundance of his/her land. Rainfed farmers’ altruistic behavior seems to be individually rather than
nterdependently determined.
.3.2. Public goods game, ﬁrst round
In the ﬁrst round of the public goods game, endogenous social effects of contributions are not observed for any of the four
eighborhoods. This result may  indicate that knowing that they will continue the game and demonstrate their cooperative
ehavior later, they reveal their personal (or un-domesticated) preference during the ﬁrst round to see how the others react
o it. The inﬂuence of neighbors’ characteristics (i.e., exogenous social effects) is generally weak as well.
The most decisive individual characteristic is age, which produces negative and highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. Because
ublic goods contribution incorporates an aspect of investment, the decision must be associated with the individual discount
ate. According to Read and Read (2004), older people discount time more than younger people, which explains our observed
oefﬁcients.23 Volumetric water pricing has no effect. As expected, risk preference is positively linked with public goods
ontribution, particularly in irrigated areas, which may  be due to a more established investment mind-set in irrigated areas.
.3.3. Public goods game, second round
In the second round of the public goods game, the farmers’ contribution behavior under the inﬂuence of monitoring and
essaging is expected to appear. In the irrigated areas, parameter  is positive and highly signiﬁcant, especially for plot
eighbors. Comparing the magnitude of  between (a) and (c), this endogenous social effect is greater and more signiﬁcant
mong plot neighbors than residential neighbors, which may  be attributed to the collective irrigation management conducted
n cooperation with plot neighbors rather than residential neighbors. As in the ﬁrst round of the game, the exogenous social
ffects are generally weak. Among the individual characteristics, the effect of age is much less signiﬁcant than during the
rst round. Under the pressure of monitoring, the volumetric pricing dummy  is positive, but the statistical signiﬁcance is
ot high. Contrary to these results, no endogenous social effect is detected in the rainfed areas.
The estimation of monitoring-related control variables deserves close attention. The coefﬁcients on MRD  are consistently
ositive and signiﬁcant, which indicates that farmers increase their contributions when they explicitly receive unhappy
23 Some studies present contrasting ﬁndings. Chao et al. (2009) observe an insigniﬁcant effect of age on time preference, while Aldy and Viscusi (2007)
eport an inverted U-shaped relationship. Nevertheless, the downward-sloping part of the inverted U may  correspond to our results because a majority of
ur  sample farmers are middle-aged or elderly.
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Table 4
Diagnostic tests for the spatial regressions.
Game experiment Dictator game Public goods game, round 1 Public goods game, round 2
Neighborhood Field plot Residential Field plot Residential Field plot Residential
Ecosystem Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed
Weight  code (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Moran’s I 0.042 −0.059 0.131 −0.082 −0.087 0.044 0.004 0.016 0.119 −0.033 0.162 −0.004
(0.050)*  (0.681) (0.001)*** (0.896) (0.849) (0.011)** (0.246) (0.060) (0.000)*** (0.408) (0.000)*** (0.164)
↓  ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
LM  on error correlation 0.616 5.332 0.850 0.118 5.001 8.135
(0.433) (0.021)** (0.357) (0.732) (0.025)** (0.004)***
LM  on lag correlation 3.034 7.854 0.759 0.010 10.961 9.849
(0.082)* (0.005)*** (0.384) (0.922) (0.001)*** (0.002)***
Robust  LM on error
correlation
12.977 2.540 0.115 0.697 0.375 0.214
(0.000)*** (0.111)† (0.735) (0.404) (0.540) (0.644)
Robust  LM on lag
correlation
15.395 5.062 0.024 0.589 6.335 1.928
(0.000)*** (0.024)** (0.878) (0.443) (0.012)** (0.165)
LM  on SARMA 16.011 10.394 0.874 0.707 11.336 10.062
(0.000)*** (0.006)*** (0.646) (0.702) (0.003)*** (0.007)***
↓  ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Spatial  model of our choice Lag and cross Cross Lag and cross Cross Cross Cross Cross Cross Lag and cross Cross Cross Cross
For  robustness check ARAR and cross Lag and cross
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
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Table  5
Spatial regressions for the dictator game.
Neighborhood Field plot Residential
Ecosystem Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed
Spatial model Lag and cross Cross Lag and cross ARAR and cross Cross
Weight code (a) (b) (c) (c) (d)
Endogenous social effect
 0.239 0.352 0.331
(0.078)* (0.004)*** (0.430)
Correlated social effect
 0.034
(0.948)
Neighbors’ characteristics
Volumetric pricing dummy −13.630 −11.492 −11.601
(0.089)* (0.109)† (0.150)†
Age 0.123 0.542 −0.105 −0.128 0.957
(0.740) (0.365) (0.763) (0.763) (0.133)
Gender dummy 4.382 −6.495 11.062 11.584 2.279
(0.589) (0.660) (0.195) (0.258) (0.871)
Years  of schooling −0.750 −1.749 −1.288 −1.322 −1.247
(0.609) (0.4428) (0.391) (0.383) (0.679)
Ln  asset −0.887 6.887 5.075 5.230 −1.655
(0.827) (0.259) (0.200) (0.218) (0.679)
Field  area (ha) 16.206 1.390 8.419 8.361 3.652
(0.008)*** (0.813) (0.135)† (0.194) (0.501)
Household size −2.513 −3.030 −1.876 −1.895 2.944
(0.140)† (0.410) (0.275) (0.317) (0.448)
Household female ratio −2.364 −24.554 21.705 23.196 16.928
(0.942) (0.439) (0.440) (0.500) (0.701)
Own  characteristics
Volumetric pricing dummy −2.131 −0.327 −0.371
(0.543) (0.922) (0.915)
Age −0.201 −0.108 −0.263 −0.266 −0.085
(0.186) (0.524) (0.077)* (0.077)* (0.622)
Gender dummy 2.914 4.954 3.526 3.605 5.678
(0.484) (0.221) (0.385) (0.407) (0.143)†
Years of schooling 0.610 0.429 0.221 0.213 0.197
(0.341) (0.488) (0.734) (0.748) (0.766)
Ln  asset −0.374 −0.451 −0.308 −0.290 −0.783
(0.820) (0.808) (0.849) (0.863) (0.691)
Field  area (ha) −0.118 2.619 −0.956 −0.920 2.694
(0.967) (0.087)* (0.723) (0.745) (0.077)*
Household size −0.323 0.296 −0.377 −0.387 1.011
(0.664) (0.721) (0.613) (0.610) (0.278)
Household female ratio 29.147 0.371 30.608 30.845 0.874
(0.013)** (0.970) (0.011)** (0.012)** (0.933)
Intercept 31.840 −33.801 −29.964 −30.609 −33.951
(0.470) (0.619) (0.494) (0.150)† (0.558)
Sample size 131 107 132 132 107
Fit  of the model
Multiple R-squared 0.186 0.160
Adjusted R-squared 0.062 0.032
F  statistic 1.506 1.252
(0.125)† (0.253)
Wald  statistic 3.865 11.480
(0.049)** (0.001)***
LR  test 8.159
(0.017)**
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
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Table  6
Spatial regressions for the public goods game, round 1.
Neighborhood Field plot Residential
Ecosystem Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed
Spatial  model Cross Cross Cross Cross
Weight code (a) (b) (c) (d)
Neighbors’ characteristics
Volumetric pricing dummy −9.637 −11.411
(0.273) (0.147)†
Age −0.623 0.474 −0.682 −1.203
(0.131)† (0.569) (0.074)* (0.166)
Gender dummy −9.676 36.025 −10.821 38.166
(0.279) (0.088)* (0.244) (0.047)**
Years  of schooling −0.152 0.687 0.533 −1.747
(0.926) (0.832) (0.755) (0.678)
Ln  asset 0.013 −9.226 3.425 −3.442
(0.998) (0.278) (0.440) (0.525)
Field  area (ha) 8.575 −0.260 2.966 6.372
(0.190) (0.975) (0.633) (0.389)
Household size −1.822 1.576 1.453 −2.251
(0.328) (0.763) (0.440) (0.668)
Household female ratio 11.186 19.973 −8.118 12.461
(0.751) (0.651) (0.790) (0.835)
Own  characteristics
Volumetric pricing dummy 0.221 0.217
(0.955) (0.954)
Age −0.450 −0.754 −0.441 −0.704
(0.008)*** (0.002)*** (0.008)*** (0.004)***
Gender dummy −4.709 −1.661 −5.778 −2.991
(0.305) (0.768) (0.195) (0.569)
Years  of schooling 0.112 −0.022 0.236 0.219
(0.876) (0.980) (0.744) (0.808)
Ln  asset 2.323 2.006 1.307 1.423
(0.201) (0.440) (0.465) (0.595)
Field  area (ha) 5.586 −2.426 5.754 −2.109
(0.069)* (0.257) (0.054)* (0.307)
Household size −0.742 −0.613 −0.575 −0.989
(0.367) (0.595) (0.486) (0.437)
Household female ratio 20.000 −15.303 18.812 −16.214
(0.125)† (0.272) (0.155) (0.259)
Control
Risk-taking behavior 0.227 0.127 0.215 0.124
(0.006)*** (0.189) (0.010)*** (0.176)
Intercept 69.559 111.424 39.920 171.388
(0.153) (0.241) (0.411) (0.031)**
Sample size 131 107 132 107
Fit  of the model
Multiple R-squared 0.232 0.203 0.256 0.225
Adjusted R-squared 0.117 0.072 0.145 0.097
F  statistic 2.012 1.547 2.302 1.762(0.016)** (0.105)† (0.005)*** (0.053)*
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and †  indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
messages from group members.24 This result is consistent with studies that demonstrate the effectiveness of costly pun-
ishments in both the laboratory and the ﬁeld (Gächter and Fehr, 2000; Ostrom, 2000; Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Balafoutas
and Nikiforakis, 2012). The FRI produces a positive coefﬁcient only in the irrigated areas. Because this index represents
farmers’ awareness of their own free riding behavior, it indicates that irrigated farmers are willing to adjust their contribu-
tion voluntarily when they notice their own over- or under-contribution. This result provides evidence of irrigated farmers’
tendency to emulate others, which represents the emergence of social norms. The MRD–FRI interaction term exhibits a
positive impact in the irrigated areas, which means the receipt of complaints is even more effective when combined with
the awareness of one’s own free riding behavior. In other words, in the irrigated areas, free riders are more responsive to
messages of dissatisfaction, while in the rainfed areas, farmers respond to complaints uniformly regardless of free riding.
24 The coefﬁcients are smaller in the irrigated areas. However, the total effect of MRD  must incorporate the cross effect of the MRD-FRI interaction as well.
Because the interaction term is signiﬁcant only in the irrigated areas, the total effect of MRD  is not considerably different between the two ecosystems.
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Table  7
Spatial regressions for the public goods game, round 2.
Neighborhood Field plot Residential
Ecosystem Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed
Spatial model Lag and cross Cross Cross Lag and cross Cross
Weight code (a) (b) (c) (c) (d)
Endogenous social effect
 0.332 0.284
(0.001)*** (0.004)***
Neighbors’ characteristics
Volumetric pricing dummy 1.337 11.436 −6.470
(0.831) (0.076)* (0.258)
Age −0.317  −0.884 −0.276 −0.221 −0.674
(0.289) (0.205) (0.377) (0.418) (0.360)
Gender  dummy 0.439 9.041 −3.750 −1.077 26.052
(0.945) (0.611) (0.627) (0.874) (0.117)†
Years of schooling −2.103 2.285 1.360 0.428 4.210
(0.070)* (0.403) (0.331) (0.731) (0.241)
Ln  asset 2.964 0.451 −1.520 −1.265 −3.320
(0.354) (0.950) (0.680) (0.694) (0.469)
Field  area (ha) 0.574 5.710 8.166 3.265 −2.221
(0.903) (0.422) (0.111)† (0.480) (0.723)
Household size −0.577 4.337 0.798 0.224 −1.021
(0.670) (0.333) (0.606) (0.868) (0.817)
Household female ratio −8.270 28.879 35.690 −28.779 −52.340
(0.742) (0.445) (0.157) (0.189) (0.299)
Own  characteristics
Volumetric pricing dummy 3.199 3.314 4.083
(0.243) (0.280) (0.128)†
Age 0.167 −0.207 0.179 0.187 −0.158
(0.170) (0.336) (0.193) (0.120)† (0.470)
Gender  dummy 2.492 −0.221 0.690 2.059 1.908
(0.438) (0.963) (0.849) (0.517) (0.666)
Years  of schooling 0.371 0.050 0.385 0.366 0.612
(0.466) (0.945) (0.516) (0.481) (0.423)
Ln  asset 1.746 1.451 1.110 1.330 1.629
(0.171) (0.512) (0.447) (0.297) (0.480)
Field  area (ha) −0.716 −2.502 1.028 0.302 −3.535
(0.749) (0.166) (0.681) (0.890) (0.045)**
Household size 0.613 0.255 0.567 0.517 −0.808
(0.291) (0.794) (0.405) (0.384) (0.466)
Household female ratio 7.872 −5.450 2.114 5.034 −7.025
(0.393) (0.659) (0.846) (0.598) (0.580)
Controls
Risk-taking behavior 0.126 0.237 0.193 0.161 0.265
(0.034)** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.001)***
Round  1, message D 7.312 10.625 7.139 7.416 10.782
(0.039)** (0.063)* (0.080)* (0.036)** (0.059)*
Round  1, free riding index (FRI) 0.212 0.014 0.232 0.266 0.046
(0.090)* (0.939) (0.090)* (0.026)** (0.800)
Round  1, message D × FRI 0.440 −0.349 0.471 0.419 −0.297
(0.044)** (0.247) (0.053)* (0.047)** (0.319)
Round  1, result 0.847 0.532 0.821 0.840 0.537
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Intercept −56.946 −19.940 −2.661 −19.659 70.045
(0.117)† (0.803) (0.949) (0.587) (0.309)
Sample size 131 107 132 132 107
Fit  of the model
Multiple R-squared 0.510 0.591 0.514
Adjusted R-squared 0.403 0.513 0.408
F  statistic 4.764 7.558 4.840
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Wald  statistic 13.042 9.141
(0.000)*** (0.002)***
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
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Table  8
Robustness checks for the spatial regressions: dictator and public goods games, round 1.
Neighborhood Field plot Residential
Ecosystem Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed
Dictator game
[W1] 6-nearest neighbors model
Spatial model Lag and cross Cross Lag and cross Cross
Endogenous social effect () 0.195 0.238
(0.148)† (0.101)†
Sample size 131 107 132 107
[W2]  1/d distance decay neighborhood model
Spatial model Lag & Cross Cross Lag & Cross Cross
Endogenous social effect () 0.484 0.487
(0.151) (0.150)†
Sample size 131 107 132 107
[W3]  Village neighbors model
Spatial model Cross Cross
Endogenous social effect ()
Sample size 129 107
Public  goods game, round 1
[W1] 6-nearest neighbors model
Spatial model Cross Cross Cross Cross
Endogenous social effect ()
Sample size 131 107 132 107
[W2]  1/d distance decay neighborhood model
Spatial model Cross Cross Cross Cross
Endogenous social effect ()
Sample size 131 107 132 107
[W3]  Village neighbors model
Spatial model Cross Cross
Endogenous social effect ()
Sample size 129 107Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
This result may  indicate the emergence of a stronger community mechanism in the irrigated areas, with which a social norm
is complemented to effectively prevent free riding. The risk preference in the irrigated areas is positive in the second round
as well. This indicates that if one’s neighbors become risk averse for whatever reason, they will reduce their contribution,
and, through neighborhood effects, he or she will eventually reduce his or her contribution. This is a possible downside of
neighborhood effects. Finally, the contribution during the ﬁrst round of the game plays a crucial role as a control variable.
7.4. Summary of ﬁndings
The ﬁndings are summarized as follows. First, neighborhood effects were generally found among geographical neighbors
in the study sites. In particular, the endogenous social effects among irrigated farmers are observed in the estimations of the
dictator game and the second round of the public goods game. The exogenous social effects are minor; no correlated social
effects are observed. Hypothesis 1 is thus supported to the extent that it depends on the irrigation availability and the type
of social behavior. Second, there is a clear contrast between the results from the two ecosystems. The endogenous social
effects and the impact of FRI are observed only in the irrigated areas, which supports Hypothesis 2. Third, comparing plot
and residential neighborhoods, the interdependence of public goods contribution under monitoring is stronger among plot
neighbors. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
8. Robustness to alternative weight matrices
There are different methods of deﬁning the weight matrix. This section brieﬂy examines the robustness and validity of
our results by introducing three alternative deﬁnitions of neighbors. A popular alternative to the use of a threshold distance
is to impose a k-nearest-neighbor criterion in which a speciﬁed number of nearest neighbors (k) to each individual are
deﬁned as neighbors, so that everyone has the same number of designated neighbors. Here, we set k at six because this is
approximately the average number of neighbors by our main model in irrigated areas where the endogenous social effects
were found. We  denote this matrix [W1]. Endogenous social effects were not found in rainfed areas due possibly to the
inclusion of many neighbors that causes noise in identifying true neighbor effects. Therefore, it is interesting to examine the
six-nearest-neighbor structure applied to both ecosystems.
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Table  9
Robustness checks for the spatial regressions: public goods game, round 2.
Neighborhood Field plot Residential
Ecosystem Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed
[W1] 6-nearest neighbors model
Spatial model Lag and cross Cross Error and cross Cross
Endogenous social effect () 0.358
(0.001)***
Correlated social effect () 0.376
(0.006)***
Round 1, message D 7.480 11.148 8.020 9.405
(0.036)** (0.057)* (0.022)** (0.109)†
Round 1, free riding index (FRI) 0.229 0.039 0.296 0.047
(0.065)* (0.833) (0.013)** (0.805)
Round  1, message D × FRI 0.453 −0.252 0.350 −0.242
(0.038)** (0.405) (0.096)* (0.445)
Sample size 131 107 132 107
[W2]  1/d  distance decay neighborhood model
Spatial model Cross Cross Cross Cross
Endogenous social effect () 0.510 0.514
(0.097)* (0.095)*
Round 1, message D 7.370 11.860 7.365 11.860
(0.031)** (0.040)** (0.030)** (0.040)**
Round  1, free riding index (FRI) 0.289 0.029 0.291 0.029
(0.015)** (0.889) (0.014)** (0.889)
Round  1, message D × FRI 0.309 −0.221 0.305 −0.221
(0.150)† (0.472) (0.154) (0.473)
Sample size 131 107 132 107
[W3]  Village neighbors model
Spatial model Cross Cross
Endogenous social effect ()
Round 1, message D 7.144 9.405
(0.058)* (0.109)†
Round 1, free riding index (FRI) 0.298 0.047
(0.020)** (0.805)
Round  1, message D × FRI 0.338 −0.242
(0.136)† (0.445)
N
a
w
t
h
t
g
p
d
a
r
o
d
s
d
n
qSample size 129 107
ote: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
Both the threshold distance and k-nearest-neighbor methods employ binary weight models, i.e., observations are deﬁned
s either neighbors or non-neighbors. An alternative method would allow the neighborhood inﬂuence to decrease gradually
ith distance. We  consider a distance decay function using the ﬁrst order inverse distance, and this matrix is denoted [W2].25
Finally, we examine a model in which all of the residents of the same village are considered neighbors and those outside
he village are non-neighbors. This matrix is denoted [W3]. Deﬁning neighborhoods by administrative unit is a method that
as been employed in conventional neighborhood effect studies, although not with spatial econometrics techniques. Note
hat plot neighborhood is not deﬁned in this approach because village membership is based on residency.
The estimation results using these three weights are presented in Table 8 for the dictator game and round 1 of the public
oods game and Table 9 for round 2 of the public goods game. Only the variables of major interest are displayed.26 For W1,
ositive endogenous social effects are observed in the irrigated areas but to a lesser extent than in the main model. In the
ictator game, the effects are smaller and statistically less signiﬁcant. In round 2 of the public goods game, the effect is
s large and signiﬁcant in the plot neighborhood as in the main model, while a correlated social effect is detected for the
esidential neighborhood. Overall, the results of the 6-nearest-neighbor model suggest robustness of the main results.
For W2, the statistical signiﬁcance of the endogenous social effects is notably lower, though the magnitude is larger. This
bservation suggests that distant residents do not contribute as strongly to behavioral interdependence as close neighbors
o because the model considers inﬂuences from quite distant neighbors to a certain extent. Still, the results from W2 also
upport the robustness of the main results. With W3, neither the spatial lag nor ARAR model is suggested by the spatial
iagnostic tests in either game. In other words, no endogenous social effect is found in this neighborhood model. The average
umber of village members is 24, and thus, village members who reside far away are modeled in to the same extent as those
uite close, which may  obscure behavioral interdependence.
25 A number of different methods to deﬁne non-threshold models exist, e.g., exponential decay.
26 See Appendix C of the online supplementary materials for the neighborhood characteristics and the full regression results.
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These robustness checks seem to reveal two  points: ﬁrst, our main results are robust to the use of alternative weight
matrices. In particular, the estimation with W1 veriﬁes that the difference in the average number of neighbors between the
two ecosystems in our main model is not the cause of the presence and absence of a behavioral interdependence. Second,
the threshold distance model is superior to the three variants for modeling the spatial interdependence in social behaviors.
In the context of irrigation management, distance, rather than village membership or number of neighbors, may  play a key
role in promoting social interaction.
9. Limitation
While our result is expected to offer an interesting contribution to the literature, it would have been even more convincing
if there had been a dynamic data set with a baseline. Admittedly, such data are unavailable, which allows one to wonder
whether our result should be interpreted as evidence of a treatment effect of irrigation. One might suspect that the result
possibly represents a selection effect, i.e., the irrigation scheme was  introduced to an area where people had already been
better networked.
To provide a clue to this issue, Section 2 described the background on why  the irrigation scheme was  introduced into
the currently irrigated area, and why not in the rainfed area and Section 3 illustrated that the sampled residents have not
undergone relocation due to the introduction of irrigation. This background information is in support of a certain extent of
random and exogenous treatment. Nonetheless, in the absence of panel data, a formal assessment of the causality is not
possible at this stage, and will be left to our future endeavors. Therefore, the main claim of this paper is limited to that the
neighborhood effect is observed, and it is stronger in the irrigated areas, with humble inference as to the role of collective
irrigation management.
10. Discussion and concluding remarks
The neighborhood effects found in our study area provide some insight into the link between behavioral patterns and
social norms for pro-social behavior. Our key result is that farmers’ altruistic and contribution behaviors are inﬂuenced by
their neighbors only in the irrigated areas. Provided that there is no innate difference in behavioral traits between irrigated
and rainfed rice farmers, which is partially supported by the descriptive tables and, more importantly, by the background
of the irrigation project, our results suggest that the collective action required in gravity irrigation management among plot
neighbors likely induces social norms in which farmers exhibit social behaviors similar to their neighbors’. However, this
ﬁnding also implies that outcomes may  not necessarily be pro-social because neighborhood effects can reduce the level of
the high contributors’ contributions to their neighbors’ level. Vicious cycles in conformism norm dissemination are a possible
process.
Our analysis also indicates that farmers’ positive corrective responses to their own  free riding behavior in the irrigated
areas may  reﬂect the induced social norms through which individuals’ free riding acts are voluntarily corrected. While the
message of dissatisfaction, a type of costly punishment, effectively increases contributions in both ecosystems, the effect is
greater on free riders in the irrigated areas. Increased demand for cooperative resource management in the real world also
promotes a community mechanism of punishment that complements the function of social norms. Cooperative activities
such as the maintenance of communal spaces and the construction of village roads are equally common in both irrigated
and rainfed areas; however, behavioral differences between the two  ecosystems are detected. This is a thought-provoking
observation on the possible impact of increased demand for collective irrigation water management on the evolution of
social norms and community mechanisms.
The irrigation systems in the study site were introduced two years before the data collection, which implies that interven-
tions such as the construction of gravity irrigation systems can generate rather rapid changes in the beneﬁciaries’ behavioral
patterns. This implication may  not be surprising: Goette et al. (2012) observe that cooperation and norm enforcement in
experimental games emerge after a few weeks of group formation in real society. However, the dynamism and sustaina-
bility of new norms and community mechanisms amid increasing heterogeneity among farmers, as well as the experience
of success or failure in irrigation management, are important issues to be explored by future research.
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